I need to use dynamic SQL in a stored procedure.
That dynamic SQL will create SQL object, therefore I cannot parameterize it and execute it with sp_executesql.
Is there some SQL function which will check the stored procedure parameter variable and tell me if there are some illegal characters? Or remove them or there is a list of these characters?
Something like
DECLARE #variable = 'password OR 1=1'
IF IsSqlInjectionPossible(#variable)
BEGIN
RAISERROR('Illegal input characters',16,1)
RETURN
END
or
SET #variable = removePossibleSqlInjection(#variable)
How do you do that?
Is there some SQL function which will check the stored procedure parameter variable and tell me if there are some illegal characters ?
There is no such function and it just cannot be
Simply because there are NO "characters that can cause sql injection". All characters used in injection are perfectly legal. Your idea of SQL injection is wrong. It is not something alien to the query, like a virus or a bacteria, but just regular SQL. So all you can do is to forbade characters that are used in SQL queries, which will make this function effectively wipe your query.
What character from 'password OR 1=1' statement you consider illegal?
Let us consider you have a form where users can ask for public data of their friends. Let us suppose further that the form posts an ID and you use that as a numeric value in your query:
select public_details
from users
where ID = 5
ID is a value you get from the user. It is not safe at all to allow users to choose the ID they are searching for, but let us ignore that for now for the sake of the example. Now if the user sends a post as follows
5 or 1=1
There is no illegal character, not even apostrophe. The problem is therefore that this is a business-logic issue and should be addressed at application level.
Related
I've been preaching both to my colleagues and here on SO about the goodness of using parameters in SQL queries, especially in .NET applications. I've even gone so far as to promise them as giving immunity against SQL injection attacks.
But I'm starting to wonder if this really is true. Are there any known SQL injection attacks that will be successfull against a parameterized query? Can you for example send a string that causes a buffer overflow on the server?
There are of course other considerations to make to ensure that a web application is safe (like sanitizing user input and all that stuff) but now I am thinking of SQL injections. I'm especially interested in attacks against MsSQL 2005 and 2008 since they are my primary databases, but all databases are interesting.
Edit: To clarify what I mean by parameters and parameterized queries. By using parameters I mean using "variables" instead of building the sql query in a string.
So instead of doing this:
SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = 'a name'
We do this:
SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = #Name
and then set the value of the #Name parameter on the query / command object.
Placeholders are enough to prevent injections. You might still be open to buffer overflows, but that is a completely different flavor of attack from an SQL injection (the attack vector would not be SQL syntax but binary). Since the parameters passed will all be escaped properly, there isn't any way for an attacker to pass data that will be treated like "live" SQL.
You can't use functions inside placeholders, and you can't use placeholders as column or table names, because they are escaped and quoted as string literals.
However, if you use parameters as part of a string concatenation inside your dynamic query, you are still vulnerable to injection, because your strings will not be escaped but will be literal. Using other types for parameters (such as integer) is safe.
That said, if you're using use input to set the value of something like security_level, then someone could just make themselves administrators in your system and have a free-for-all. But that's just basic input validation, and has nothing to do with SQL injection.
No, there is still risk of SQL injection any time you interpolate unvalidated data into an SQL query.
Query parameters help to avoid this risk by separating literal values from the SQL syntax.
'SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE colname = ?'
That's fine, but there are other purposes of interpolating data into a dynamic SQL query that cannot use query parameters, because it's not an SQL value but instead a table name, column name, expression, or some other syntax.
'SELECT * FROM ' + #tablename + ' WHERE colname IN (' + #comma_list + ')'
' ORDER BY ' + #colname'
It doesn't matter whether you're using stored procedures or executing dynamic SQL queries directly from application code. The risk is still there.
The remedy in these cases is to employ FIEO as needed:
Filter Input: validate that the data look like legitimate integers, table names, column names, etc. before you interpolate them.
Escape Output: in this case "output" means putting data into a SQL query. We use functions to transform variables used as string literals in an SQL expression, so that quote marks and other special characters inside the string are escaped. We should also use functions to transform variables that would be used as table names, column names, etc. As for other syntax, like writing whole SQL expressions dynamically, that's a more complex problem.
There seems to be some confusion in this thread about the definition of a "parameterised query".
SQL such as a stored proc that accepts parameters.
SQL that is called using the DBMS Parameters collection.
Given the former definition, many of the links show working attacks.
But the "normal" definition is the latter one. Given that definition, I don't know of any SQL injection attack that will work. That doesn't mean that there isn't one, but I have yet to see it.
From the comments, I'm not expressing myself clearly enough, so here's an example that will hopefully be clearer:
This approach is open to SQL injection
exec dbo.MyStoredProc 'DodgyText'
This approach isn't open to SQL injection
using (SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("dbo.MyStoredProc", testConnection))
{
cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure;
SqlParameter newParam = new SqlParameter(paramName, SqlDbType.Varchar);
newParam.Value = "DodgyText";
.....
cmd.Parameters.Add(newParam);
.....
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
any sql parameter of string type (varchar, nvarchar, etc) that is used to construct a dynamic query is still vulnerable
otherwise the parameter type conversion (e.g. to int, decimal, date, etc.) should eliminate any attempt to inject sql via the parameter
EDIT: an example, where parameter #p1 is intended to be a table name
create procedure dbo.uspBeAfraidBeVeryAfraid ( #p1 varchar(64) )
AS
SET NOCOUNT ON
declare #sql varchar(512)
set #sql = 'select * from ' + #p1
exec(#sql)
GO
If #p1 is selected from a drop-down list it is a potential sql-injection attack vector;
If #p1 is formulated programmatically w/out the ability of the user to intervene then it is not a potential sql-injection attack vector
A buffer overflow is not SQL injection.
Parametrized queries guarantee you are safe against SQL injection. They don't guarantee there aren't possible exploits in the form of bugs in your SQL server, but nothing will guarantee that.
Your data is not safe if you use dynamic sql in any way shape or form because the permissions must be at the table level. Yes you have limited the type and amount of injection attack from that particular query, but not limited the access a user can get if he or she finds a way into the system and you are completely vunerable to internal users accessing what they shouldn't in order to commit fraud or steal personal information to sell. Dynamic SQL of any type is a dangerous practice. If you use non-dynamic stored procs, you can set permissions at the procesdure level and no user can do anything except what is defined by the procs (except system admins of course).
It is possible for a stored proc to be vulnerable to special types of SQL injection via overflow/truncation, see: Injection Enabled by Data Truncation here:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx
Just remember that with parameters you can easily store the string, or say username if you don't have any policies, "); drop table users; --"
This in itself won't cause any harm, but you better know where and how that date is used further on in your application (e.g. stored in a cookie, retrieved later on to do other stuff.
You can run dynamic sql as example
DECLARE #SQL NVARCHAR(4000);
DECLARE #ParameterDefinition NVARCHAR(4000);
SELECT #ParameterDefinition = '#date varchar(10)'
SET #SQL='Select CAST(#date AS DATETIME) Date'
EXEC sp_executeSQL #SQL,#ParameterDefinition,#date='04/15/2011'
I am trying to accomplish a simple licensing system in golang and have tried numerous ways to get it to work. Basically, I have input a couple of random licensing keys into my database and my golang program should check to see if the user-input key exists and if it does then add the user specified username and password into the database to login later.
This is the code that I have that hasn't been working:
"IF EXISTS (SELECT * FROM login WHERE LK = "+reglicenceEntry.Text()+") THEN
INSERT INTO `login` (`Username`, `Password`, `LK`) VALUES
('"+regusernameEntry.Text()+"', '"+regpasswordEntry.Text()+"', ''); "
This is the golang error:
Error 1064: You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near 'IF EXISTS (SELECT * FROM login WHERE LK = '5qp515YHXEmSDzwqgoJh') THEN INSERT IN' at line 1
Thanks so much!
MySQL syntax doesn't support IF...THEN constructs except within stored routines and triggers and events. See https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/sql-syntax-compound-statements.html
I suggest an alternative solution for your code:
INSERT INTO `login` (`Username`, `Password`, `LK`)
SELECT ?, ?, ''
FROM `login`
WHERE `LK` = ?
LIMIT 1
If your login table does not have the LK value, the SELECT above will return 0 rows, therefore it will not insert anything.
If your login table has the LK value, the SELECT above will return at least 1 row (and I limit it to 1), therefore it will insert a row. The row it inserts is comprised of your username and password, and a blank string for the LK.
I showed use of parameter placeholders. You should use parameters in SQL instead of concatenating variables into your query. This is good practice to avoid accidental SQL injection. See http://go-database-sql.org/prepared.html for examples.
The purpose of using parameters is to avoid SQL injection problems. See my answer to What is SQL injection? for an explanation of SQL injection.
Or my presentation SQL Injection Myths and Fallacies (or youtube video).
When using parameters, you do two steps.
The first step to prepare a query with placeholders (?) where you would otherwise concatenate variables into your SQL query.
The second step is to execute the prepared query, and this is the time you pass the variables to fill in the placeholders.
The point is to keep variables separate from your query, so if there's anything in the variable that could unintentionally change your SQL syntax (like imbalanced quotes), it is never combined with the SQL. After you do the prepare, the SQL has already been parsed by the MySQL server, and there's no way to change the syntax after that.
MySQL remembers which parts of the query need to be filled in, and when you pass variables during the execute step, MySQL fills in the missing parts of the query using your values — but this happens within the MySQL server, not in your application.
Thus the dynamic parts of the query — your variables — are kept separate from the SQL syntax and you avoid SQL injection problems.
For your task described in your question, it would look something like this (I have not tested this Go code, but it should put you on the right path).
stmt, err := tx.Prepare("INSERT INTO `login` (`Username`, `Password`, `LK`) SELECT ?, ?, '' FROM `login` WHERE `LK` = ? LIMIT 1")
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
defer stmt.Close()
_, err = stmt.Exec(regusernameEntry.Text(), regpasswordEntry.Text(), reglicenceEntry.Text())
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
The order of parameters is important. The variables you pass to Exec() must be in the same order that the ? placeholders appear in your prepared SQL statement. They are matched up, one for one, in the same order, by the MySQL server.
Do not put quotes around the placeholders in your prepared SQL statement. That will work as a literal string '?' in SQL. Use an unquoted ? character for a placeholder. When it gets combined by MySQL in the server, it will work as if you had put quotes around the value like a string — but with no risk of SQL injection even if that string value containing special characters.
Here's another site that gives more code examples: https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/wiki/Examples
The Exec() function is for executing SQL that has no result set, like INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE. There are other functions in the Go SQL driver like Query() and QueryRow() that also accept parameter arguments. You'd use these if your SQL returns a result set.
Can i do something like below, let me know
IF #parameter=1 BEGIN ...query... END IF #parameter=2
Need the correct syntax if it is possible.
It's OLE DB connection.
Not a Stored Proc. just a sql query
DECLARE #param AS INT = ?;
IF #param = 1
BEGIN
SELECT 1 AS Y;
END
ELSE IF #param = 2
BEGIN
SELECT 2 AS Y;
END
There are two question marks in your query and probably you were passing only one variable. I have seen code where developers pass the same value twice (or multiple) times. This is inefficient. A better way is to receive the passed parameters in SSIS variables. Advantages:
1. You need to pass one value only once.
2. More importantly, if you change the order in which the passed parameters are used in the sql, you do not need to change their order on the user-interface of Execute SQL Task Editor//Parameters. This is what Andy Leonard has suggested later in his response.
You can. Assuming you are referring to an Execute SQL Task, the parameters in an Execute SQL Task using an OLE DB connection utilize question marks (?) as parameter placeholders. You map the placeholders to SSIS variables on the Parameter Mapping page of the Execute SQL Task. In the SQLStatement property you would enter:
If (?=1)
begin
... {some T-SQL here} ...
end
If (?=2)
begin
... {some T-SQL here} ...
end
That's one way to accomplish what I think you are asking.
Another way is to create an Execute SQL Task to read the value of #parameter from the database into an SSIS variable. Then you can build two Execute SQL Tasks - one with each option for T-SQL as the SQLStatement property - and use expressions on precedent constraints to determine which Execute SQL Task to execute.
Hope this helps,
:{>
You cannot use Execute SQL Task to run Transact-SQL statements.
For setting conditional SQL Statement based on what you are trying to achieve.
In Execute SQL Task editor
In general tab, leave the SQLStatement blank.
In parameter mapping tab, add parameter and map User::Parameter variable to Parameter Name 0.
In Expression tab, set the SQLStatementSource to
(DT_NUMERIC, 18, 0) #[User::Parameter]==1 ? ...query 1... : ...query 2...
I wanted to create a new table, but I have a syntax error somewhere.
However I do not see where, no matter how often I look over it.
Can anybody spot my error?
Dim cmdCreate As New MySqlCommand("CREATE TABLE inout (inout_seacher TEXT,inout_guid TEXT,inout_blob LONGBLOB,inout_inouttype INTEGER,inout_automaticallyparsed TINYINT(1)," & _
"inout_price DOUBLE,inout_companyguid TEXT,inout_datetime TEXT,inout_title TEXT,inout_catid INTEGER,inout_vat INTEGER,inout_banktype INTEGER," & _
"inout_banktransferprice DOUBLE,inout_expenseinvoiceexistsinguid TEXT,inout_orderguid TEXT,inout_inoutsubtype INTEGER,inout_outinvoicetype INTEGER)", g_CnWebDB)
Thank you for the help!
Bad luck. Believe it or not 'inout' is a reserved word in MySQL. Either wrap it in backticks (`) or (better) call it something else. Also, are you sure you want DOUBLE and not DECIMAL?
"inout" is reserved word. Try other name for the table.
You can also quote the table's name using (), so (inout`) becomes acceptable.
As Strawberry already said, is a reserved word used for procedures; directly from MySQL.com:
As of MySQL 5.0.30, stored procedures that take no arguments can be
invoked without parentheses. That is, CALL p() and CALL p are
equivalent.
CALL can pass back values to its caller using parameters that are
declared as OUT or INOUT parameters. When the procedure returns, a
client program can also obtain the number of rows affected for the
final statement executed within the routine: At the SQL level, call
the ROW_COUNT() function; from the C API, call the
mysql_affected_rows() function.
I want to pass a table name as a parameter in a Postgres function. I tried this code:
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION some_f(param character varying) RETURNS integer
AS $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (select * from quote_ident($1) where quote_ident($1).id=1) THEN
return 1;
END IF;
return 0;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
select some_f('table_name');
And I got this:
ERROR: syntax error at or near "."
LINE 4: ...elect * from quote_ident($1) where quote_ident($1).id=1)...
^
********** Error **********
ERROR: syntax error at or near "."
And here is the error I got when changed to this select * from quote_ident($1) tab where tab.id=1:
ERROR: column tab.id does not exist
LINE 1: ...T EXISTS (select * from quote_ident($1) tab where tab.id...
Probably, quote_ident($1) works, because without the where quote_ident($1).id=1 part I get 1, which means something is selected. Why may the first quote_ident($1) work and the second one not at the same time? And how could this be solved?
Before you go there: for only few, known tables names, it's typically simpler to avoid dynamic SQL and spell out the few code variants in separate functions or in a CASE construct.
That said, what you are trying to achieve can be simplified and improved:
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION some_f(_tbl regclass, OUT result integer)
LANGUAGE plpgsql AS
$func$
BEGIN
EXECUTE format('SELECT (EXISTS (SELECT FROM %s WHERE id = 1))::int', _tbl)
INTO result;
END
$func$;
Call with schema-qualified name (see below):
SELECT some_f('myschema.mytable'); -- would fail with quote_ident()
Or:
SELECT some_f('"my very uncommon table name"');
Major points
Use an OUT parameter to simplify the function. You can directly select the result of the dynamic SQL into it and be done. No need for additional variables and code.
EXISTS does exactly what you want. You get true if the row exists or false otherwise. There are various ways to do this, EXISTS is typically most efficient.
You seem to want an integer back, so I cast the boolean result from EXISTS to integer, which yields exactly what you had. I would return boolean instead.
I use the object identifier type regclass as input type for _tbl. That does everything quote_ident(_tbl) or format('%I', _tbl) would do, but better, because:
.. it prevents SQL injection just as well.
.. it fails immediately and more gracefully if the table name is invalid / does not exist / is invisible to the current user. (A regclass parameter is only applicable for existing tables.)
.. it works with schema-qualified table names, where a plain quote_ident(_tbl) or format(%I) would fail because they cannot resolve the ambiguity. You would have to pass and escape schema and table names separately.
It only works for existing tables, obviously.
I still use format(), because it simplifies the syntax (and to demonstrate how it's used), but with %s instead of %I. Typically, queries are more complex so format() helps more. For the simple example we could as well just concatenate:
EXECUTE 'SELECT (EXISTS (SELECT FROM ' || _tbl || ' WHERE id = 1))::int'
No need to table-qualify the id column while there is only a single table in the FROM list. No ambiguity possible in this example. (Dynamic) SQL commands inside EXECUTE have a separate scope, function variables or parameters are not visible there - as opposed to plain SQL commands in the function body.
Here's why you always escape user input for dynamic SQL properly:
db<>fiddle here demonstrating SQL injection
Old sqlfiddle
If at all possible, don't do this.
That's the answer—it's an anti-pattern. If the client knows the table it wants data from, then SELECT FROM ThatTable. If a database is designed in a way that this is required, it seems to be designed sub-optimally. If a data access layer needs to know whether a value exists in a table, it is easy to compose SQL in that code, and pushing this code into the database is not good.
To me this seems like installing a device inside an elevator where one can type in the number of the desired floor. After the Go button is pressed, it moves a mechanical hand over to the correct button for the desired floor and presses it. This introduces many potential issues.
Please note: there is no intention of mockery, here. My silly elevator example was *the very best device I could imagine* for succinctly pointing out issues with this technique. It adds a useless layer of indirection, moving table name choice from a caller space (using a robust and well-understood DSL, SQL) into a hybrid using obscure/bizarre server-side SQL code.
Such responsibility-splitting through movement of query construction logic into dynamic SQL makes the code harder to understand. It violates a standard and reliable convention (how a SQL query chooses what to select) in the name of custom code fraught with potential for error.
Here are detailed points on some of the potential problems with this approach:
Dynamic SQL offers the possibility of SQL injection that is hard to recognize in the front end code or the back end code alone (one must inspect them together to see this).
Stored procedures and functions can access resources that the SP/function owner has rights to but the caller doesn't. As far as I understand, without special care, then by default when you use code that produces dynamic SQL and runs it, the database executes the dynamic SQL under the rights of the caller. This means you either won't be able to use privileged objects at all, or you have to open them up to all clients, increasing the surface area of potential attack to privileged data. Setting the SP/function at creation time to always run as a particular user (in SQL Server, EXECUTE AS) may solve that problem, but makes things more complicated. This exacerbates the risk of SQL injection mentioned in the previous point, by making the dynamic SQL a very enticing attack vector.
When a developer must understand what the application code is doing in order to modify it or fix a bug, he'll find it very difficult to get the exact SQL query being executed. SQL profiler can be used, but this takes special privileges and can have negative performance effects on production systems. The executed query can be logged by the SP but this increases complexity for questionable benefit (requiring accommodating new tables, purging old data, etc.) and is quite non-obvious. In fact, some applications are architected such that the developer does not have database credentials, so it becomes almost impossible for him to actually see the query being submitted.
When an error occurs, such as when you try to select a table that doesn't exist, you'll get a message along the lines of "invalid object name" from the database. That will happen exactly the same whether you're composing the SQL in the back end or the database, but the difference is, some poor developer who's trying to troubleshoot the system has to spelunk one level deeper into yet another cave below the one where the problem exists, to dig into the wonder-procedure that Does It All to try to figure out what the problem is. Logs won't show "Error in GetWidget", it will show "Error in OneProcedureToRuleThemAllRunner". This abstraction will generally make a system worse.
An example in pseudo-C# of switching table names based on a parameter:
string sql = $"SELECT * FROM {EscapeSqlIdentifier(tableName)};"
results = connection.Execute(sql);
While this does not eliminate every possible issue imaginable, the flaws I outlined with the other technique are absent from this example.
Inside plpgsql code, The EXECUTE statement must be used for queries in which table names or columns come from variables. Also the IF EXISTS (<query>) construct is not allowed when query is dynamically generated.
Here's your function with both problems fixed:
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION some_f(param character varying) RETURNS integer
AS $$
DECLARE
v int;
BEGIN
EXECUTE 'select 1 FROM ' || quote_ident(param) || ' WHERE '
|| quote_ident(param) || '.id = 1' INTO v;
IF v THEN return 1; ELSE return 0; END IF;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
I know this is an old thread, but I ran across it recently when trying to solve the same problem - in my case, for some fairly complex scripts.
Turning the entire script into dynamic SQL is not ideal. It's tedious and error-prone work, and you lose the ability to parameterize: parameters must be interpolated into constants in the SQL, with bad consequences for performance and security.
Here's a simple trick that lets you keep the SQL intact if you only need to select from your table - use dynamic SQL to create a temporary view:
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION some_f(_tbl varchar) returns integer
AS $$
BEGIN
drop view if exists myview;
execute format('create temporary view myview as select * from %s', _tbl);
-- now you can reference myview in the SQL
IF EXISTS (select * from myview where myview.id=1) THEN
return 1;
END IF;
return 0;
END;
$$ language plpgsql;
The first doesn't actually "work" in the sense that you mean, it works only in so far as it does not generate an error.
Try SELECT * FROM quote_ident('table_that_does_not_exist');, and you will see why your function returns 1: the select is returning a table with one column (named quote_ident) with one row (the variable $1 or in this particular case table_that_does_not_exist).
What you want to do will require dynamic SQL, which is actually the place that the quote_* functions are meant to be used.
If the question was to test if the table is empty or not (id=1), here is a simplified version of Erwin's stored proc :
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION isEmpty(tableName text, OUT zeroIfEmpty integer) AS
$func$
BEGIN
EXECUTE format('SELECT COALESCE ((SELECT 1 FROM %s LIMIT 1),0)', tableName)
INTO zeroIfEmpty;
END
$func$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
If you want table name, column name and value to be dynamically passed to function as parameter
use this code
create or replace function total_rows(tbl_name text, column_name text, value int)
returns integer as $total$
declare
total integer;
begin
EXECUTE format('select count(*) from %s WHERE %s = %s', tbl_name, column_name, value) INTO total;
return total;
end;
$total$ language plpgsql;
postgres=# select total_rows('tbl_name','column_name',2); --2 is the value
I have 9.4 version of PostgreSQL and I always use this code:
CREATE FUNCTION add_new_table(text) RETURNS void AS
$BODY$
begin
execute
'CREATE TABLE ' || $1 || '(
item_1 type,
item_2 type
)';
end;
$BODY$
LANGUAGE plpgsql
And then:
SELECT add_new_table('my_table_name');
It works good for me.
Attention! Above example is one of those which shows "How do not if we want to keep safety during querying the database" :P